Judicial activism and the limits of judicial interference in legislative and executive functions

Abstract

This paper analyzes the phenomenon of judicial activism and the limits of the Judiciary’s interference in legislative and executive functions, focusing on the role played by the Supreme Federal Court (STF). The relevance of the topic stems from the increasing involvement of the Judiciary in matters traditionally assigned to the Legislative and Executive branches, a phenomenon that has sparked intense debate about the boundaries of constitutional jurisdiction and the balance between Powers. From a methodological perspective, this is a documentary and bibliographic study with a qualitative approach. The historical-critical method was adopted to contextualize judicial activism in Brazil, complemented by jurisprudential analysis of emblematic cases and a theoretical-deductive comparison of doctrinal currents regarding the separation of powers, democratic legitimacy, and the contours of constitutional jurisdiction. The study shows that judicial activism can serve as a mechanism for the realization of fundamental rights, especially in the face of legislative inertia, but it also presents democratic risks when exceeding the Judiciary’s constitutional competencies. It concludes that although judicial activism is legitimate, it faces the challenge of balancing the protection of fundamental rights with the preservation of the separation of powers, through criteria of judicial self-restraint and the strengthening of democratic and institutional processes.